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Abstract
This paper estimates a household model where both the production and con-
sumption sides are observed. The household activities produce both marketable
and nonmarketable products. Family members consume market goods, domesti-
cally produced goods and leisure. This household equilibrium model is described
within a collective framework. The data are from a nation-wide sample of Italian
farm-households. The estimation is implemented using a generalized Heckman esti-
mator to account for corner solutions generated by the fact that not all households
are engaged in all enterpreneurial activities and do not consume some of all goods
and leisure. The identiﬁcation of the sharing rule stems from the assignability of
clothing consumption and leisure.
Key words: Household collective model, household and domestic productions,
consumption and leisure, separability.
1 Introduction
This paper estimates a household economy model where both the production and con-
sumption sides are observed. The general equilibrium representation of the farm house-
hold is a landmark model in development microeconomics (Singh, Squire and Strauss
1986, Benjamin 1992, Udry 1996, Bardhan and Udry 1999, Jorgenson and Lau 2000,
UPDATE). Recently, the farm household model is gaining renewed interest also in more
developed societies, because it lends the basic theory to explain the behaviour of house-
hold enteprises in general. In the present work, in order to analyze the household as a
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1collection of individuals rather than a undi erentiated unitary decision unit, the house-
hold farm model is extended to embrace the recent results introduced by Apps and Rees
(1988, 1997) and Chiappori (1988, 1992, 1997).
Econometric estimations of the farm model are an e ort that has been undertaken
since the late 1970s (Lau, Lin, and Yotopoulos 1978, Lau et al. 1981) and then abandoned
because of the lack of appropriate survey data. The objective of this paper is to take
advantage of the availability of a data set of italian farm household incorporating farm
level data and information about time use and consumption habits of the rural households.
In order to implement the estimation of the household general equilibrium model an
empirical issue is the presence of specialized production and consumption responsible for
zero realizations. We deal with this problem using an extension of the heckman model
that we term generalized Heckman.
The paper contributes to the existing household collective literature in many respects.
In Section 2, we show a household collective equilibrium model that takes into account
both marketable and nonmarketable productions and consumption-leisure decisions. In
general, only one production activity (the nonmarketable) is modelled (Apps and Rees
1997, 2001, Chiappori 1997). The equilibrium of the household economy is supported
by separability between production and consumption-leisure decisions making empirical
applications tractable.
Section 3 shows the empirical application of the household equilibrium model. The
model is estimated within a collective framework allowing the recovery of individual util-
ities and welfare levels. We estimate recursively the marketable production, the domestic
production, and two individual-speciﬁc demand systems for three market goods, a do-
mestically produced good and leisure. The estimation of the household production side
permits us to test the separability property between production and consumption choices
underlying our estimation procedure. Moreover, the individual-speciﬁc demand system
allows recovering the sharing rule by means of a structural approach developed by Menon
and Perali (2010). Information about assignable clothing and leisure consumption is used
to estimate the rule governing the distribution of resources within the household.
The estimation is carried out using a sample of Italian farm household described in
Section 4. Household data are drawn from the 1995 Survey on Socio-Economic Character-
istics of Italian Rural Household (ISMEA). These farm household data have the features
required to employ our household collective model. The survey combines information
about household and farm characteristics, time use, farm proﬁts, o -farm money income,
governmental and intra-household transfers, consumption, and information about the
degree of autonomy in decision making by household members.
Section 5 shows that the distribution of power moves toward the woman when her
education is higher and the age di erence is smaller and the wife having greater inde-
pendence in deciding whether to work o -farm. In general, the household production,
domestic production, and consumption results are coeherent with the theory. We deem
2that the approach to household behaviour proposed in the paper can provide valuable
information for designing appropriate welfare policies in general.
2 The Collective Household Enterprise Model
Each family can be viewed as an enterprise producing goods by transforming factors
which are in part nonmarket goods. The enterprise household model presented in this
section is general because it describes the family as involved both in production and in
consumption activities. It embraces both urban and rural households in relation to the
location of both the household and the entrepreneurial activity. The enterprise household
model is a miniature equilibrium model where it fully reproduces the characteristics of a
macro society at the micro level.
Whether the produced goods are marketable has important implications on the struc-
ture of the model. If markets exist, then the production can be sold on the market, or,
the same goods and services can be bought on the market at a given price. Because
households are price takers for every commodity including labour, production decisions
are taken independently from consumption and labour supply decisions. If markets of
the domestic good are incomplete, its price is endogenous to household behavior and in
general the separation property between production and consumption decisions does not
longer hold.1
Our model is general also in the sense that the household is represented as a collection
of individuals (Chiappori 1988, 1992, 1997). Di erently from the unitary approach that
considers the family as the basic decision unit with a joint preference structure, collective
models describe the family as a group of individuals each of whom is characterized by
speciﬁc preferences interacting within a collective decision process explaining the rules
of intrahousehold allocation of individual consumption and welfare. The intrahousehold
allocation process is not directly observable but it can be recovered from available in-
formation on the private consumption of exclusive goods or assignable goods (Chiappori
1988, 1992, Chiappori and Ekeland 2009).
The collective approach makes no assumption about the decision process. It only re-
quires that the outcome of the family model is Pareto e cient. Family decisions therefore
take place as if it were a two-stage budgeting process. Supposing that the family pool its
resources, total household income is then allocated to single members according to a pre-
determined sharing rule deﬁning the intrahousehold income distribution. It follows that
each member, while choosing the most preferred utility maximizing bundle of goods and
leisure, faces an individual budget constraint. The collective approach permits recovering
1Notice that in both market regimes, the value of labour not employed outside the family is implicit.
However, only in the complete market case the value of labour is objectively deducible from the value of
the marginal product, while in the case of missing markets the value of labour may be imputed at the
opportunity cost (Jenkins and O’Leary 1994, 1995, 1996).
3both private consumption and individual welfare functions.
Note that throughout this section superscript i indicates endogenous variables while
subscript i indicates exogenous variables. Moreover, to simplify notation, in this section
we ignore socio-demographic variables that may a ect both production technologies and
preferences of the family. Observable heterogeneity will be consider in the empirical
section.
2.1 Individual Preferences and Production Technologies
We assume that the family comprises two adult members, denoted by i =1 ,2, each of
whom has individual preferences over the consumption of an aggregate market good ci,a
domestically produced good zi, and leisure time li. Individual preferences are represented
by a strictly quasiconcave and increasing utility function Ui(ci,zi,l i), where it is assumed
that individual consumption is purely private. Family members can allocate their time
to the labour market at a market wage of wi. The family faces a market price pi to buy
good ci.
The family is engaged in the production of both marketable and nonmarketable goods.
To distinguish between the two type of products, we term the former household products
and the latter domestic products.2 In the present setting, the household economy is
endowed with two technologies describing the production processes of marketable goods
and goods that cannot be sold in the market and are entirely consumed within the
household. We consider that all family members work both in the household business and
in the home activities. The production environnment has no externalities and products
are disjoint.
In the case of perfect markets, the implicit valuation of time is the value of the
marginal product. if household labour is allocated both in the household enterprise and
home production, then consumption and production decisions are separable. proﬁts are
exogenous and a ect the consumption decision process.
The technology to produce the household product q sold at the market price pq is









where hi is the time supplied by member i to the business activity and xq is a bought-in
market input whose price is px. The household product q can be totally or partially sold
2Interestingly, while a household may not be engaged in producing marketable goods, it is always
involved in household activities. In this sense, all households can be considered as an enterprises. For
example, rural households engage in farming, urban households may run a job from home being connected
to the workplace through internet, may run an ice-cream factory, or a tailor shop. At the same time,
they are all involved in managing and undertaking household activities. However, household technologies
employed in producing nonmarket goods can be observed if time use data are also available.
4on the market at an exogenous price equal to pq. In our model we assume that the family
does not consume any quantity of the household product.
The domestic technology to produce the good z is represented by a concave and












where ti is the time supplied by member i to produce z. Note that, without loss of gen-
erality, the domestic technology is speciﬁed in terms of working-time supplied by family
members only. This assumption is common to other papers (Apps and Rees 1996, 2001).
Because the domestic good is not marketable it is entirely consumed by family members
in an unkonwn proportion and both its price and the scale of the domestic activities are
unknown. However, a su cient condition to specify an observable technology comes from
the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (Constant Returns to Scale) We assume that the domestic production
function is homogenous of degree one.
Each member allocates her own time endowment Ti to three di erent working activ-







with Li,h i,t i,l i > 0 for all i =1 ,2. Matteazzi, Menon, and Perali (2010) extend this
enterprise household collective model to the cases of individual specialization to on-farm
labour and domestic works and, therefore, the contraint Li   0 is introduced in the
structure of the model.








i + y + pqq   pxxq, (4)
where y is non-labour family income assumed to be exogenously. Measuring the total





















where   = pqq 
 
i=1,2 wihi pxxq is the proﬁt function of household production activity,
and TC = w1t1 + w2t2 are the total costs faced by the family to produce the domestic
good z.
52.2 The Centralized Equilibrium Model
Within a collective framework (Browning and Chiappori 1998), the family makes Pareto-












where the Pareto weight µ is a function that captures the bargaining power of individuals




































From the ﬁrst-order conditions, in equilibrium the market price pq of the household
product q is equal to the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers assocated with the household





and the equilibrium conditions of the household input factors are
pq
 f





they show that in equilibrium the optimal level of inputs is determined by equality be-
tween the marginal value products and their market prices. Equations (11) and (12)
together with household technology (7) are su cient to derive the optimal household
production decisions
˜ q = q (pq,w 1,w 2,p x), (13)
˜ xq = xq (pq,w 1,w 2,p x), (14)
˜ h
i = h
i (pq,w 1,w 2,p x),i =1 ,2. (15)




 ti = wi,i =1 ,2. (16)
6Note that when the output’s market is missing, from the ﬁrst-order conditions we do
not have relationship (10). This implies that the price of the domestic good is shadow
and equal to the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers  z
  . In general, because of this result
the domestic decisions are a ected by family preferences and therefore the separation
property between production and leisure-consumption choices fails to hold. However, the
following proposition shows a su cient condition for the separation to hold even though
the price of the domestic product is endogenous to family preferences and the decision
process µ.
Proposition 1. When markets of the domestic goods are missing, given Assumption 1
the implicit price p 
z of the domestic good is not a ected by preferences and the decision
process µ of the family.
Proof. A crucial implication of technologies with constant returns to scale is that the
corresponding minimum cost is a function linear in the output, that is




In equilibrium we deﬁne the implicit price p 
z of the domestic good as the marginal cost




 TC (w1,w 2,z)
 zi
, (18)
that given equation (17) it reduces to
p
 
z = Pz (w1,w 2), (19)
where Pz (w1,w 2) is a unit cost function that is independent of the production scale.
This result is a su cient condition for the separation property to hold when markets of
the domestic goods are absent. Another feature of this result is that the implicit price p 
z
is the same for both family members. This follows from assuming production technologies
of the form z1 + z2 = g(t1,t 2). By standard economic theory, in equilibrium marginal
costs are equal to the Lagrange multipliers and in equation (16)  z
  can be opportunely
replaced with the implicit price of the domestic good p 
z.
Given Proposition 1, equation (16) becomes p 
z
 g




i (w1,w 2,z),i =1 ,2, (20)
that are function of market wages and a given output level z.


















7that along with the linear budget constraint
 
i=1,2













i =0 , (23)
where the minimum cost function   TC = p 
z
 2
i=1 zi and the optimal proﬁts  (pq,w 1,w 2,p x)















z,w 1,w 2,y,µ), (26)
for the family members i =1 ,2. To summarize, in this section we show that production
and leisure-consumption choices are separable even though markets for the domestic good
are missing. In the case of missing markets for the separation property to hold a su cient
condition is that household technology exhibits constant returns to scale. The implication
is that the household equilibrium model can be solved recursively in two stages. In the
ﬁrst stage, the household will decide the optimal time devoted to the production activities,
then it will decide the optimal consumption of the market goods, leisure and domestic
goods.
2.3 The Decentralized Equilibrium Model and Double Separabil-
ity
In general, in the unitary farm household model the separability property is limited to the
space of production and consumption decisions made at the household level. Di erently,
in collective model the separability property extends to consumption decisions as well.
In particular, in collective models there exists separability between consumption choices
of family members. We introduce a deﬁnition of the separability property accounting for
the collective framework of our model.
Deﬁnition 1. (Double Separability) In the context of collective models with production
and consumption decisions, if markets are competitive, individual preferences and tech-
nologies are convex, and given a redistributive rule   of household resources between family
members such that the sum of the individual income transfers satisﬁes the total household
income, then the optimal solution
 
˜ q,˜ xq,˜ hi,˜ ti,˜ ci, ˜ zi,˜ li
 
with i=1,2 of the Pareto farm
household collective model (6) can be obtained by solving recursively the following optimal
problems
1. First, the household makes production decisions by maximizing proﬁts subject to
technology constraints independently of consumption-leisure decisions;
82. Secondly, given an income transfer, each individual makes consumption-leisure de-
cisions by maximizing her individual utility function subject to an individual budget
constraint.
In Deﬁnition 1, the ﬁrst point refers to the traditional concept of separability between
production and consumption within farm household model, while the second point is
speciﬁc to collective models and is independent of modelling production together with
consumption. Note that competitive markets are a su cient condition for the separability
between production and consumption to hold, Proposition 1 shows that separability is
maintained even when markets are imperfect or missing.
Therefore, by Deﬁnition 1, ﬁrst the family decides about the production activities.
In our model there are two speciﬁc production decisions. In particular, the optimal
household production is derived by the maximization of the proﬁt function
max
q,h1,h2,xq
  = pqq   w1h
1   w2h
2   pxxq (27)
subject to the techonology constraint q = f (h1,h 2,x q). The ﬁrst-order conditions for
this problem can be written as
pq
 f





yielding the optimal output supply ¯ q = q (pq,w 1,w 2,p x) and input factors demands
¯ xq = xq (pq,w 1,w 2,p x), ¯ hi = hi (pq,w 1,w 2,p x) for i =1 ,2, with proﬁts equal to ¯   =
  (pq,w 1,w 2,p x). Note that within farm household models proﬁts stemming from mar-
ketable production activities generate real (positive or negative) ﬂows of net income to
the family. In other words, here proﬁts are not a concept of imputed or shadow income.
Given Proposition 1, even though the market of z is missing, also the domestic produc-
tion choices are separable from the consumption-leisure decisions. Di erently from the
case of marketable household good q, here the family has a cost minimizing behaviour.
This evidence clearly appears in the budget constraint of program (6). Thereby, the
family decides the input factor demands by solving the following constrained program
min
t1,t2 TC = w1t
1 + w2t
2, (30)
subject to z = z1 + z2 = g(t1,t 2). The ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem are
¯  z
 g
 ti = wi,i =1 ,2. (31)
where ¯  z is a Lagrange multiplier, that yield the optimal factor inputs ¯ ti = ti (w1,w 2,z)
for i =1 ,2. Substituting these two equations into the objective function we derive the
9minimum cost function TC =
 2
i=1 witi (w1,w 2,z)=p 
z
 1
i=2 zi. Because the domestic
good is nonmarketable, the costs bear by the family to produce z are interpreted as
implicit costs.
The double separability property comes from the fact that in collective models, given
an appropriate allocation of household resources, the Pareto optimum consumption-
leisure model (6) can be decentralized into two individual consumption-leisure problems.
Individuals agree on an unspeciﬁed rule to allocate nonlabour income and proﬁts, then












i = wiTi +  i (p1,p 2,w 1,w 2,y+¯  ),
where  i is the sharing rule function with  1 =  (p1,p 2,w 1,w 2,y+¯  ) and  2 =  1  
(y +¯  ). Notice that family members decide the allocation among them of nonlabour
income and optimal proﬁts. As a consequence of this result, the sharing rule changes also
because of changes in proﬁts (Matteazzi, Menon, and Perali 2010).

































z,w i, i (p1,p 2,w 1,w 2,y+¯  )). (37)
Note that by letting ¯  z =  z
  , we have a one-to-one correspondence between (28-29), (31),
(33-34), and (11-12), (16), (21-22). Therefore, any solution to problems (27), (30), and
(32) is a solution to the Pareto problem (6), and vice versa. In the following sections
we estimate the enterprise household model presented in this section. The empirical
estimation of the model is based on the double separability condition. Consequently,
the proposed empirical procedure is based on estimating separately production from
consumption-leisure variables and, then, consumption-leisure decisions are estimated for
each household member independently from each other.
103 The Econometric Speciﬁcation
Under separability, the equilibrium problem of the household is recursive. Production
decisions are not a ected by the household’s endowments, preferences, characteristics or
decision processes. On the other hand, consumption decisions are a ected by production
choices since proﬁts are part of the budget constraint. The separation between production
and consumption decisions is ensured by the household rational behavior in presence of
complete markets. Recent empirical works (Benjamin 1992, Udry 1998, Pavoni and Perali
2000) show that production decisions do depend on farmers’ preferences and endowments.
The jointness in decision making is evident even in the absence of market failures when the
same input, such as time, is shared across the household and home production processes
and in presence of home consumption of the household marketable product. Imperfections
in the labour, credit and land markets are commonly observed in empirical work.
The household economy is described by specifying a technology for the marketable
and nonmarketable production and the individual consumption of goods bought on the
market, of domestic product and of leisure. We rule out the possibility of family con-
sumption of the marketable household product. The sharing rule is estimated using a
structural approach exploiting the assignability of both the individual expenditure of
clothing and leisure. We ﬁrst present the empirical speciﬁcation of the production side
of the household economy and then its consumption side.
3.1 The Production Side of the Enterprise Household Economy
We specify a restricted short-run cost function with two quasi-ﬁxed factor, family labor
and land structure and capital. By specifying family labour as a quasi-ﬁxed factor, we
do not have to impute a market wage for family labour, but we can estimate it as the
shadow wage corresponding to the value of the marginal product. In doing so, we can
derive the implicit wage of the on-farm family labour supply and testing for the hypothesis
of separability between production and consumption decisions underlying our theoretical
household model. Moreover, by separating hired and family labour it implies that we
need to model a censoring process also on the input side for the hired labour.
3.1.1 Household Production and the Implicit Value of On-Farm Family Labour
Cost functions can be used to measure the features of the adopted technology and the
impact of agents’ behaviour as input or output prices change. The welfare impact can be
di erent depending on the exogenous characteristics of the farm household. The modiﬁed
cost function of the household production Cq can be written as:





xxq| q = f (h,xq;dq), ¯ h = h
 
, (38)
11where px is a n-vector of input prices, xq is an n-vector of bought-in market inputs, h
is a k-vector of quasi-ﬁxed factors, q is an m-vector of predetermined levels of outputs,
and dq is an l-vector of exogenous characteristics of the farm-family workers, f is a
transformation fuction with the usual properties. The quasi-ﬁxed factors are on-farm
family labour supply, capital, and land.
We estimate a system composed by a restricted translog cost function with four out-
puts - crop, livestock, milk, and fruit olives and grapes - three variable inputs - materials,
chemicals, and hired labour - and three quasi-ﬁxed factors - family labour h1, land h2 and
capital h3 - modiﬁed with a translating function to accomodate three quasi-ﬁxed factors
and its derivatives with respect to input prices. Quasi-ﬁxed inputs act as exogenous fac-
tors modifying the cost function via shifting. The translog total cost function modiﬁed
via a translating transformation (Pollak and Wales 1981, Lewbel 1985) can be written as
lnCq =  0 +
4  
i=1
 i lnqi +
3  
r=1



























 rj lnpxr lnhj +  q,
where pxr is the market price of the r-th input xq, and  q is the error term assumed to
be independent and identically distributed. The scaling demographic function





is speciﬁed as linear in the logarithm function of the exogenous characteristics d . The
set of demographic characteristics transforming family work includes age and education
of household head and family labour per hectare.
Using Shephard’s lemma, the derivatives of the logarithm of cost function with respect
to the logarithm of input prices can be written as
sr =  r +
3  
k=1
 rk lndqk +
3  
j=1






 rilnqi +  qr, (41)
where sr =  
p 
xxq
Cq =  
  lnCq
  lnpx is the share of the r-th input in costs. Homogeneity of degree
one in px of the cost function implies the following parametric restrictions
3  
r=1









 rk = 0 =
3  
r=1
 rj =0 , (42)
and symmetry
 ij =  ji, rs =  sr (43)
are imposed as maintained hypothesis.
12Implicit wage of on-farm family labour and a test for separability The ex-
ogenous characteristics, such as wages, prices, nonlabour income, of the farm household
a ect both the production and consumption sides of the micro economy. Within the
theory of the enterprise households this is an interesting feature since it permits testing
the separability hypothesis between production and consumption-leisure decisions (Ben-
jamin 1992, Jacoby 1993, Le 2010, Udry 1996). We test the hypotehsis of separability
by comparing the e ective shadow wage of on-farm labour supply with the competitive
market wage of hired labour.
The derivation of the implicit wage for the on-farm labour supply is as follows. From
the equilibrium conditions of problem (38), the value of the marginal product of family





where the Lagrange multiplier   can be interpreted as the implicit wage of family labour
w . Then, if farm households are minimizing costs, in equilibrium we have
 Cq
 
px,q,¯ h,dq,d  
 
 ¯ h1
= L¯ h1 =  , (45)









where the implicit wage of family labour is obtained by di erentiating total costs with
respect to the level of the quasi-ﬁxed factor.
Calculating the implicit price of all the quasi-ﬁxed inputs, we potentially can derive
the augmented cost function3 of the farm household ˆ Cq as
ˆ Cq(px,q,¯ h,dq,d  )=Cq
 
px,q,¯ h(px,w








The economic interpretation of this equation is that the total farm costs are obtained by
summing up the imputed cost of the quasi-ﬁxed inputs w ¯ h(px,w  ,q) to the short-run
total costs Cq (·).
Using equation (39), the implicit wage of family labour is derived as the marginal
e ect of a long-run change in ﬁxed factors on total costs
w
  =
 Cq(px,q,¯ h,dq,d  )
 ¯ h1
=
  lnCq(px,q,¯ h,dq,d  )













where Cq and h1 are total costs and family on-farm working hours, respectively. Given the
functional form of the total costs, we can also perform the marginal e ect of demographic
3The augmented cost function is the dual concept of the pureﬁed proﬁt function analysed by Paris
(1989).
13characteristics on total costs
 Cq(pxq,q,¯ h,dq,d  )
 d j
=
  lnCq(pxq,q,¯ h,dq,d  )
 d j
Cq =(  1 ·  j)Cq. (49)





 Cq(px,q,¯ h,dq,d  )
 d j
(50)
that is obtained by summing up the e ective shadow wage with the total contribution to
the marginal productivity of labour provided by the characteristics of the worker.
3.1.2 Domestic Production
The observability of domestic production requires that at least some of the inputs em-
ployed in the household technology are observed. Time use data report information on
the allocation of time between the di erent household activities and leisure. In this set-
ting, leisure is no longer deﬁned as the complement of hours of work. When the household
product is not marketable, as is the case of family activities undertaken within the house-
hold, both the price of the output good is unknown and the scale of the activities is often
unknown so the necessary condition to specify an observable technology comes from the
assumption of constant returns to scale. When the domestic product cannot be sold on
the market, the price is endogenous and speciﬁc to each household.
The shadow price of the domestic good can be determined from the production side
of the domestic-household model. Considering that we do not know the level of the
aggregate domestically produced good z, we assume that the domestic production func-
tion has constant returns to scale and is linearly homogeneous. It follows that returns
equal costs, pzz =
 3
i=1 witi, and the cost function is homothetic TC(w1,w 2,w 3,z,dz)=
Pz(w1,w 2,w 3,d z)z. Therefore, the shadow price of the domestic good equals the unit
cost function pz = Pz(w1,w 2,w 3,d z) and depends on wages of the husband w1, wives w2,
other household components w3, and household characteristics dz.
The household program consists in minimizing the following domestic cost function
TC
TC(p,w,dh,d f) = min
t {w
 t | z = g(t;dz)}. (51)
We assume that the domestic cost function takes the translog functional form. The unit
cost function can be recovered from the estimates of the share equations associated with
the cost of time allocated to domestic production by each family member as follows
witi
 








aij lnwj, i,j =1 ,...,3. (52)

























where  z is the error term assumed to be independent and identically distributed. As
pointed out by Chiappori (1997), this aspect is critical for identiﬁcation of the sharing
rule. Functionally di erent parametric structural models may be consistent with the
same reduced form, thus revealing an identiﬁcation problem. Because of this, the price of
the domestic product has been instrumented and the sharing rule can be recovered also
in presence of nonmarketable domestic production (Rapoport, Sofer, Solaz 2003).
3.2 The Consumption Side of the Enterprise Household Economy
The household consumes four market goods aggregated into food, clothing for the male,
clothing for the female and other goods, the domestic product and leisure. The assignabil-
ity of clothing and leisure is the source of identiﬁcation of the sharing rule.
3.2.1 Individual-Speciﬁc Demand Systems and the Sharing Rule
The chosen structure of individual preferences taking the Gorman polar form (PIGLOG?)
is linear in individual full income Yi and is demographically transformed using the trans-
lating technique (Pollak and Wales 1971). The associated indirect utility function for
individual i =1 ,2 is
V
i(Pik,Y i;di,d f)=
ln i ( ,Yi)   ln T
i (di,P ik)   lnAi(Pik)
Bi(Pik)
, (54)
where Pik = {pi,p z,w i} is the set of prices for three market composite goods ci, the domes-




k tik(di)ln(Pik) is the individual speciﬁc ﬁxed cost component associated
with the demographic characteristics. The traslating demographic function tik(di) is
speciﬁed for empirical convenience as tik(di) =
 
n  ikn ln(din) for the set of demographic
characteristics for each individual i, di =( di1,...,diN). Part of the heterogeneity across
households is captured by the variables describing the number of children, two region
dummies, and (years?) education of the wife. The function  i( ,Yi) is the sharing rule
where Yi is the individual full income, and   is a set of variables explaining the decision
process within the family. These variables in general are the exogenous prices entering
the budegt constraint and distribution factors df. Distribution factors a ect the decision
process without inﬂuencing preferences or the budget constraint. In the estimation we use
the information about the degree of independence of the wife in making decisions about
her o -farm employment, family nonlabuor income, wife and husband age and education
ratio as distribution factors.
15The price indexes Ai(Pik) and Bi(Pik) take the translog and Cobb-Douglas form,
respectively,
lnAi(pi,p z,w i) = lnAi(Pik)= i0 +
K  
k=1







 ikr lnPir lnPik, (55)






Roy’s identity yields the following system of modiﬁed share equations
sik =  ik + tik(di)+
R  
r=1
 ikr lnPir +  i ln
 
  
i ( ,Yi,d i)
Ai(Pik)
 
+  ik, (57)
where sik = Pikki/Yi,  
i =  i( ,Yi) 
 
k tik(di)ln(Pik), and  ik is the error term assumed
to be independent and identically distributed.
For the sharing rule we assume the following structural form4
 i( ,Yi)=Yim( ), (58)
such that  i (·)+ j(·)=Y,5 and therefore  j(·)=Y    i (·), where Y is the household
full income. The sharing rule represents the household income transfer to individual i. In
the context of consumer behaviour, the sharing rule deﬁnes the opportunity set bounding
consumer choices of each family member. Equation (58) can be interpreted as the shadow
full income of individual i. It is shadow in the sense that one cannot correctly observe
the intrahousehold transfer to member i. The function m(·) acts as a scaling function of
individual full income capturing the size of the intrahousehold transfers. Notice that for
Y   Yim>0, then 0 <m  Y/Yi.
For the budget shares (57) to be derived from rational preferences, in addition to the
usual conditions of adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry, the following restriction on
the scaling function m(·) is in order.6
Proposition 2. The scaling function m(·) is homogeneous of degree zero in all its mon-
etary arguments
Proof. Let ˆ Yi = ˆ  i
 
 , ¯ Ui
 
= Yim( ) be the cost function of individual i corresponding
to the minimum expenditure necessary to attain utility level ¯ Ui at some price vectors  .
4The structural form used for the sharing rule is analogue to the deﬁnition of Barten prices. Di erently,
here individual income (rather than prices) interacts with exogenous variables capturing the bargaining
power of household members.
5In order to guarantee this adding-up restriction in the logarithms, let lnYi =  i lnY be the logarithm
of i full income, where  i = Yi
Y with
 
i=1,2  i =1 . Deﬁning the sharing rule in log terms as ln i =
lnYi + lnm(·), and ln j = lnYj   lnm(·), then ln 1 + ln 2 = lnY is fullﬁlled.
6To our knowledge Chiuri and Simmons (1997) is the only other paper arguing that the sharing rule
is homogenous of degree one.
16For ˆ  i (·) to be a legitimate cost function homogeneuos of degree one, the multiplicative
scaling function m(·) must be homogenous of degree zero in all its arguments (or just in
the monetary variables?) .
It is worth remarking that the demand systems of the two individuals have in common
only the set of parameters of the scaling function m(·), and therefore the two systems
of share equations are estimated jointly. Estimation of the parameters of the scaling
function m(·) is achieved by means of this joint estimation procedure.7 For the scaling







where  j =( w1,w 2,p 1,p 2,y,df) are information about the individual wages wi, the price
of the exclusive market goods pi, nonlabour income y, and distribution factors df. In
principle, the sharing rule can be a function of all prices entering the budget constraint.
However, for the sake of estimation parsimoniousness, we decide to use only the informa-
tion that potentially predicts the allocation process between the family members. Note
that the identiﬁcation of the sharing rule, conditional on the chosen functional form,
comes from leisure and individual clothing expenditure which are exclusive goods (Chi-
appori and Ekeland 2009).
For equation (57) to be consistent with the collective model derived in Section 2 and
















 j =0 ,
must hold, with k =1 ,...,5,n =1 ,...,4, and j =1 ,...,6. We estimate the individual
demand systems (57) for the two members by imposing these consistency restrictions as
maintained hypothesis.
4 Data
The empirical analysis of this work is based on a sub-sample of the 1995 ISMEA Survey on
Socio-Economic Characteristics of Italian Rural Household. The survey combines infor-
mation about household and farm characteristics, time use, farm proﬁts, o -farm money
income, governmental and intra-household transfers, consumption, and information about
the degree of autonomy in decision making by household members. The availability of
7Menon and Perali (2010) provide the formal proof for the identiﬁcation of the parameters of the
scaling function m(·).
17this information is the basis for the estimation of both global and full income. The IS-
MEA data base merges four survey types in one: 1) farm accounting survey, 2) stylized
time use survey, 3) expenditure survey, and 4) income survey.
The ISMEA 1995 survey is a nationwide farm household survey of 1xxx farm-households.
The sampling has been based on the last Agricultural Census conducted in 1992 by the
Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). The questionnaire has been designed on
the basis of a behavioral model (Caiumi and Perali 1997) with the speciﬁc aim of gath-
ering statistical information on the behavior of each family member and on the sharing
of public and private resources within the household. The consumption survey records
information about the consumption of some exclusive goods such as clothing for the
mother, father and children. The stylized time use survey is also a source about the
private consumption of leisure and its use for child care activities or housekeeping. This
information about the consumption of exclusive goods is a su cient set of information
to identify the rule governing the intrahousehold allocation of resources. The evaluation
of the household unpaid work has been carried out using the market opportunity cost
for the domestic activities reported in the time use section of the survey undertaken by
each household member during an average week-day (Castagnini and Perali 2001). This
method estimates the potential wage that could have been obtained by each household
member given her/his level of personal characteristics and related skills .
The descriptive statistics of the variables included in the econometric execution along
with their deﬁnition and unit of measurement are reported in Table 1, 2 and 3 for farm
production, household production and consumption, respectively.
5 Results
The econometric results related to the production elasticities of domestic and farm pro-
duction, shadow wages, the elasticities of consumption for both the husband and the wife
along with the sharing rule governing the intra-household resource allocation process are
described in Table 5 through Table 13. In general, the results of both the production and
the consumption side of the household economy conform with economic theory.
Table 5 shows the own and cross price elasticities of household production with respect
to changes in the wages of the husband, the wife, and other household members and in
the price of input goods used in the production of the composite household product. In
line with expectations, the e ect of an increase in wage is especially signiﬁcant for the
wife and the other members of the household. Husbands contribute relatively less. The
wife’s wage is a complement of the domestic production of the husband; conversely, the
husband’s wage is a complement.
Domestic wages have been constructed using the opportunity cost approach valuing
the time spent by a household member as the income foregone when deciding to be
employed in home activities rather then taking on a o -family working option. The
18estimates of the domestic technology have been used to derive the price of the domestic
good to be used on the consumption side of the household economy. Being endogenous
by construction it has been instrumented.
5.1 Household Production
Tables 6 through 9 describe the farm technology. Inspection of Table 6 reveals that the
demand for variable inputs conform with theory because higher prices reduce demand.
Hired labor, chemicals and materials are complements. The output elasticities with
respect to a change in variable inputs are described in Table 7. In line with expectations,
an increase in crop or milk production has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on hired
labor. An increase in crop production also increases the use of chemicals and materials.
The use of chemicals reduces if the production of fruits and other vegetables increase.
An expansion of the production of milk or livestock does not increase the demand for
chemical products. An increase in milk production demands more materials, while an
increase in livestock production can be obtained with a reduction in the use of materials.
The speciﬁcation of the demand for inputs is a function of their prices, whose impact is
described in Table 6, outputs, described in Table 7, and farm and personal characteristics
of the head of the farm-household which are presented in Table 8. The demand for hired
labour is relatively higher if a farm-household is located in the South with respect to the
North. In the South, farm-households demand relatively less chemicals and materials. A
farm-household located in the plains have a relatively higher demand for hired labour and
chemicals with respect to farm-households located in the hills and the mountains. The
remaining three variables have an indirect impact on the demand for inputs and a direct
e ect on the e ective use of the quasi-ﬁxed factor family labor. These e ects are also
present in the cost function where they interact with factor prices as shown in equation
(9). Their e ect is more properly described in the impact of the e ective shadow wage
capturing the di erences across farmers due to their level of experience, related to age,
and skills, related to education. Two farmers with the same productivity may di er in
terms of e ectiveness because of di erences in their experience and skills. The number of
children per hectare is a proxy for the lower e ective wage of the female component when
the number of children is large, especially when the farm size is large and the demand
for family labor is relatively higher.
Table 9 reports the Allen elasticities of substitution describing the curvature of the
farm technology. The negative signs of the own-e ects associated with a change in the
price of the variable inputs is an evidence of the regularity of the technology.
Estimated shadow wages for family labour are presented in table 10 along with the
objective market wages available o -farm to the people with the average characteristics
of the farm-household type they belong (Castagnini, Menon, and Perali 2004), and the
wage of hired labourers as collected in the ISMEA questionnaires. The comparison of
19the shadow wage with the market wage is a test of the separability hypothesis. The
fact that shadow wages are signiﬁcantly di erent from market wages is an evidence in
support of the hypothesis of non-separability of production and consumption household
decisions. This property is incorporated in the micro general equilibrium model of the
farm-household.
Interestingly, the mean of the shadow wage for the non-professional farm-households,
that is the sum of the limited resource, retirement, residential, and small farms, is
lower than the mean market wage and wage paid to hired workers. The fact that non-
professional farmers keep farming seems to be an expression of irrational behaviour.
However, the decision to be self-employed in the farm stems from the comparison of the
shadow wage with the expected market wage derived by multiplying the subjective per-
ception of the probability to ﬁnd a job in the market with the estimated market wage.
Considering the increasing aging process of the non-professional agricultural manpower,
it would not be surprising that the subjective probabilities to ﬁnd a job are su ciently
low so that shadow wages can be in fact higher than expected market wages.
On the other hand, the average shadow wage for the professional farms, composed
by the remaining farm-household types, is higher than the observed market wage. It is
therefore rational for professional farmers to keep themselves in business.
5.2 Individual Consumption and Estimates of the Intrahousehold
Resource Allocation
The consumption side of the economy is described by the own and cross-price elasticities
for the demand of domestic goods, leisure and food, clothing and other goods both the
husband and for the wife. The own elasticities are in line with expectations, but for
other goods where the e ect is positive but not signiﬁcantly di erent from zero for both
the husband and the wife. The consumption behaviour of the husband and the wife is
comparable both in term of price and income e ect. Leisure, as expected, is a luxury
good for both couple members. Demographic elasticities described in Table 12 are also
in line with expectations. The number of children, for example, positively a ects the
demand of food and clothing consumed by both the husband and the wife.
The knowledge of the sharing rule is useful to derive individual utilities of the couple
members in order to identify the individual behavioural response to a policy shock. The
sharing rule is a function that can be modiﬁed by intervening in the exogenous policy
variables represented by the distribution factor. Inspection of the graphs reveals that
relative prices of leisure and clothing have a negligible impact on the allocation rule, while
male non-labor income and the age di erence between members of the couple decrease the
bargaining power held by the husband. In the micro-simulation of the general equilibrium
model, we will see that small changes in the distribution of power across couple members
has a highly signiﬁcant impact on behaviour.
20It is relevant to note that the set of estimated elasticities is the same for all household
types, but heterogeneity has been dealt with by introducing modifying functions which
incorporate the characteristics of the farm, operators and consumers. Farm-households
technologies may in fact di er because of the level employed of quasi-ﬁxed factors and
other exogenous characteristics describing di erences across farms and farm-operators.
The collective model of the household also incorporates heterogeneity in a natural way
by identifying the behaviour of the members of the household.
6 Conclusions
The simulation analysis of the impact at the microlevel of the macro agricultural policies
requires the estimation of the supply elasticity of agricultural products, of the input
demands, and substitution e ects. Farmers respond di erently to the variation of market
prices and to government incentives in relation, for example, to farm size, to the human
and physical resources available to both the farm and the household entetrprises and the
geographic locatioin. The success of many environmental policies depends by the farm
technolgies adopted in the production process. The cross-e ects related to the products
supplied and factors used can be as important as the direct e ects. The comprehension of
the distributive e ects requires estimates of direct and cross-elasticites disaggregated for
the policy relevant farm typologies. The results presented here are for the representative
type.
The model speciﬁcation descends from the theory of the farm-household. It represents
the basic economic unit of Italian agriculture. In 1990, 79 percent of Italian farms is at
the same time a consumption and production unit employment exclusively household
members as workers. Farm-household manage 52 percent of the Italian agricultural land.
The study lends special attention to the econometric problems generated by the fact
that not all farms produce at least some quantity of each product and not all household
consume some quantity of all goods. This is a problem typical of individual data which
is particularly sensible when individual rather than household consumption is taken into
account. The estimation of the sharing rule is obtained from consumption information
considering that we do not know who does what within the farm, while we know, at
least for those goods exclusively consumed by the husband or the wife, who consumes
what within the household. The distribution of power moves toward the woman when
her education is higher and the age di erence is smaller and the wife having greater
independence in deciding whether to work o -farm. In general, the farm production,
domestic production, and consumption results are coeherent with the theory. Therefore,
they can be properly used to undertake behavioral microsimulation analysis both at the
micro and macro economic level within a general equilibrium framework of the household
enterprise.
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23A Econometric Methodology Used to Estimate the Sys-
tem of Censored Equations
In this section, we review two feasible methods of estimation for systems of equations
with multiple censored variables. In our problem, censoring comes both from the pro-
duction and the consumption side of the household economy. The generalized Heckman
procedure is the Heckman two-step estimator extended to a system of equations, while
the maximum simulated likelihood method (Hajivassiliou, McFadden and Ruud 1996)
uses multiple integrals that are computed with a simulated algorithm to reproduce the
statistical process that generated the zero realizations. Both methods provide unbiased
estimates of the structural parameters. However, in the simulated maximum likelihood
approach the variance covariance matrix of the parameters is a full matrix, while in the
case of the generalized Heckman estimator only the diagonal terms can be estimated.
We discuss both methods, because we use the generalized Heckman approach, which
is computationally less demanding, to obtain reliable starting values for the simulated
maximum likelihood estimation.
We describe the two proposed estimation methods using a general representation of
a system of equations with censored endogenous variables. Each equation in the system
can be written as:
yi = fi(xi, i)+ui if fi(xi, i)+ui > 0
yi =0 if fi(xi, i)+ui < 0 (60)
where, yi is the endogenous variable corresponding to the i-th equation in the system,
xi is a vector of explanatory variables,  i is a vector of parameters and ui is a random
variable. Precisely, ui is the i-th component of a multivariate normal random vector u of
mean zero and variance  . Therefore,




i is the i-th diagonal term of the matrix  .
A.1 Generalized Heckman estimator
This procedure amounts to transform the system of censored equations in (60) into a sys-
tem of uncensored equations by using the appropriate correction. We start by considering
the expected value of the endogenous variable conditional on a positive observation.











24where,   and   are respectively the probability density function and the cumula-
tive density function of a standard normal distribution. Then, the unconditional mean
(conditional only on explanatory variables) can be written as:











Using the expression for the unconditional expected value of each endogenous variable
we consider the following system of uncensored equations:










+  i (63)
where  it = yit   E [(yi|xit].
The system in (63) can be estimated by maximum likelihood assuming that:
    MV N (0, )
where,   is a random vector which i-th element is  i. Two point can be made here.
First, this is a straightforward maximum likelihood estimation since the system in (63)
does not contain any censored equation. Second, it important to keep in mind that the
random variables  i are di erent from the random variables of the censored system ui.
25B Results of the Econometric Collective Family Enter-
prise Model
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables used in the Econometric Analysis  
Source ISMEA 1995 
Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Couple full income - log    9.002  0.2366  8.160  9.938 
    Male Budget Shares 
Domestic    0.215  0.1164  0.019  0.702 
Food    0.156  0.0684  0.029  0.540 
Clothing    0.003  0.0029  0.000  0.035 
Other goods    0.212  0.1120  0.039  0.827 
Leisure    0.415  0.1465  0.009  0.777 
    Female Budget Shares 
Domestic    0.268  0.1335  0.043  0.823 
Food    0.135  0.0614  0.022  0.604 
Clothing    0.003  0.0024  0.000  0.019 
Other goods    0.184  0.1027  0.038  0.778 
Leisure    0.410  0.1572  0.008  0.810 
    Prices in Log 
Male domestic    3.540  0.5756  2.132  5.699 
Food    2.369  0.2541  1.163  3.698 
Male clothing    1.858  0.9570  -1.276  4.972 
Other goods    6.547  0.6521  4.735  8.722 
Male leisure    2.256  0.0485  2.097  2.575 
Female domestic    3.855  0.6990  2.132  5.795 
Female clothing    1.956  0.9203  -2.414  4.458 
Female leisure    2.226  0.0619  2.097  2.419 
     
North  D1  0.363    0  1 
South&Islands  D2  0.416    0  1 
Hill  D12  0.771    0  1 
No. of children  D3  1.367  1.0925  0  7 
Wife education  D4  1.169  0.4246  1  3 
D.my =1 wife decides on off farm labour  D7  0.068    0  1 
Male full income in log    8.225  0.2642  7.306  9.206 
Female full income in log    8.376  0.2546  7.419  9.300 
Male non labor income in log  Newlexp_m  4.643  3.7545  -11.629  10.865 
Female non labor income in log  Newlexp_f  6.719  2.5633  -11.496  11.475 
D.my =1 if farm inherits by the husband  D9  0.658    0  1 
Wife and husnad age poroportion  D10  0.479  0.0235  0.378  0.722 
Wife and husnad education proportion  D11  0.420  0.0878  0.2  0.667 
Wife and husband relative price of leisure  prleis  0.971  0.0463  0.791  1.135 
Wife and husband relative price of clothing  prcloth  1.413  1.2641  0.007  20.333 
Husband age / mean (husband age)    D5  1  0.2104  0.389  1.331 
D.my =1 if high educated husband   D6  0.545    0  1 
D13           
Z1 – Log of family labour, hours per month    5.296  0.8313  0.916  7.404 
Z2 – Log of 5% of capital    4.412  1.9367  -2.120  9.188 
Z3 – Log of total hectares    1.658  1.7271  -6.377  5.521 
  26The Production side of the Household Economy
Domestic Production
Table 2 Household Production 
Own and Cross-price Elasticities 
 
Husband 
Wage  Wife Wage  Others Wage 
Price of 
Inputs 
Husband Domestic Share  -0.147  0.420  -0.911  2.580 
Wife Domestic Share  -0.558  -0.958  1.350  0.089 
Other Components Domestic Share  -0.029  -0.137  -1.650  0.619 
Demand for Inputs - Share  -0.060  0.278  -0.670  -0.939 
              
 
Farm Production
Table 3. Input Prices 
  Hired labour  Chemicals  Materials 
Hired labour  -0.3647  0.1403  0.1866 
Chemicals  0.304  -0.6513  0.3094 
Materials  0.3095  0.2411  -0.6072 
 
Table 4: Output Elasticities - Factors  
   Crops  Fruits and Other Vegetables  Milk  Livestock 
Hired labour  0.266  0.006  0.234  0.061 
Chemicals  0.335  -0.155  0.036  0.029 
Materials  0.222  0.073  0.265  -0.109 
 
Table 5: Elasticities with respect to Farm Characteristics - Factors  
    North  South  Planes  Head’s Age  Head’s Educ  No.Children/Ha 
Hired labour  0.339  0.674  0.181  0.123  0.055  -0.010 
Chemicals  0.102  -0.366  0.335  0.081  0.020  0.045 
Materials  -0.245  -1.012  -0.088  0.311  0.000  0.059 
 
Table 6: Allen Elasticities of Substitution - Factors 
   Hired labour  Chemicals  Materials 
Hired labour  -2.923  0.364  0.396 
Chemicals    -2.698  0.999 
Materials      -1.961 
 
27Shadow Wages and Separability Test
Table 7: Shadow Wage, Wage off, and Wage of Hired Labour by Farm Typologies, Values are in Italian Lire 
   Shadow wage    Wage-off    Wage hired  
labour 
Sample  8571    11589    8896 
           
Limited-resource  1515    12083    10360 
Retirement  3851    19240    10319 
Residential/lifestyle  4146    12795    14535 
Farming occupation/lower-sales 
2286    11293    12030 
Farming occupation/higher-sales 
5020    11339    8038 
Large family farms  12677    11684    8301 
Very large family farms  34390    11625    9378 
 
 
Consumption side of the Household Economy
Table 8: Compensated Price Elasticites and Income Elasticities 
   Husband    
  Domestic good  Food  Clothing  Other  Leisure  Income 
Domestic good  -0.338  0.007  0.036  0.045  0.142  0.410 
Food  0.005  -0.409  0.071  0.071  0.106  0.115 
Clothing  0.001  0.002  -0.199  -0.001  0.001  0.085 
Other  0.044  0.097  -0.041  0.037  -0.074  0.191 
Leisure  0.288  0.303  0.134  -0.153  -0.176  1.998 
   Wife   
  Domestic good  Food  Clothing  Other  Leisure  Income 
Domestic good  -0.254  0.022  -0.005  0.041  0.134  0.484 
Food  0.011  -0.390  0.051  0.065  0.085  0.115 
Clothing  0.000  0.001  -0.205  0.000  0.001  0.096 
Other  0.028  0.089  0.020  0.056  -0.068  0.140 
Leisure  0.215  0.278  0.139  -0.162  -0.152  1.960 
             
 
28Table 9: Demographic Elasticities 
Husband 
 
North  South-Island  No. Children  Wife educ. 
Domestic good  -0.069  0.062  -0.006  0.012 
Food  0.249  -0.100  0.154  -0.018 
Clothing  0.095  0.203  0.136  -0.002 
Other  0.004  0.016  -0.014  -0.032 
Leisure  -0.056  -0.005  -0.046  0.016 
Wife 
 
North  South-Island  No. Children  Wife educ. 
Domestic good  0.051  0.066  -0.028  -0.027 
Food  0.239  -0.098  0.153  -0.025 
Clothing  0.033  0.123  0.123  0.001 
Other  0.009  0.016  -0.016  0.007 
Leisure  -0.109  -0.019  -0.024  0.021 
         
 
Intrahousehold Resource Allocation
Table 10:  Summary of Predicted and Actual Sharing Rules 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
         
  Husband 
Predicted sharing rule  0.401  0.0447  0.252  0.615 
Actual sharing rule  0.463  0.0505  0.291  0.705 
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